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The Constitutionality of Local Zoning*
Suburban control of metropolitan land development is a troubling
reminder that the American ideal of representative democracy has not
yet been achieved. Suburbs alone regulate the use and development of
most vacant land in metropolitan areas,' yet this regulation has a
pervasive effect upon the lives of people outside the borders of tile
suburbs. State delegation of control over vacant land use to suburban-
ites thus conflicts with a basic notion of representative democracy-
that the governed should have a voice in the decision-making process.
This denial of representation is all the more serious because identi-
fiable groups are likely to be permanently excluded from participation.
Restrictive land use policies purposely exclude those who, if they had
access to the ballot box, would vote to change current policies. Small
and relatively homogeneous groups, immune from political competi-
tion, are thus able to perpetuate their power over other, generally
poorer groups in the society.2
* The Law Journal wishes to express its Uanks to Professor David Trubek of tile
Yale Law School for his assistance in the development of this Note.
1. Any precise definition of the word "suburb" is unnecessary for the purposes of
this Note. For a critical look at definitional problems of this nature, see Milner, Th
Folk-Urban Continuum, 17 Amr. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 529 (1952); Wirth, Urbanism as a
Way of Life, 44 Ar. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 1 (1938). For purposes of this Note, small nu.
nicipalities abutting the central city which completely share its characteristicl are not
suburbs.
It is almost tautological to say that it is the suburbs of metropolitan areas wh
have the most vacant land. In the New York City region, as defined by the Regional
Plan Association, only 12.5% of the land at the core, New York City, is vacant, compared
to 31.1%, 66.0% and 86.4% in the "Inner," "Intermediate," and "Outer" Ring counties.
REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, SPREAD CITY 42 (1962). Densities vary inversely with the
percentage of land that is vacant.
In Connecticut the same pattern holds true. "Less than two per cent of the land
in New Haven is undeveloped. Most of that is marsh land . 1. " I NAT'L Co tM'N ON
URBAN PROBLEMS, HEARINGS 118 (1967) (Mayor Richard Lee). In 1966 th Connecticut
Development Commission found 6% of New Haven's land, 639 acres, vacant as compared
to 65% of the land. 15,570 acres, in Madison, one of New aven's suburbs. Similarly,
7% of the land in Bridgeport was vacant, as compared to 61% in Greenwich and 56%
in Fairfield. In passing, it might be noted that 58% of the vacant land in Fairfield,
42% in Greenwich, and 85% in Madison was zoned for single family residential con-
struction on more than one, but less than two acres. AMxERICAN SOCIurY ov PLANNING,
OFFmICAs, NEW Di renoNs IN CONNEcrICUT PLANNING 191 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Nmv DiREaiONS]. See generally, Niedercorn & Hearle, Recent Land-Use "T'rends in 4"
Large American Cities, 40 LAND ECON. 105 (1964).
2. Suburbs tend toward homogeneity in income, occupation, education, and sometine
ethnic group. See E. HoovER & R. VERNON, ANATOMY OF A METROPOLIS 146-74 (1959):
Duncan 8. Duncan, Residential Distribution and Occupation Stratification, 60 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 493 (1955). See also R. WOOD, SUIURIA 114-25 (1958); Schnore, The Socict.
Economic Status of Cities and Suburbs, 28 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL Rv. 76 (1963), These
differences do not disappear with time; rather, the socio-economic character of a suburb
appears to maintain itself over long periods. Farley, Suburban Persistence, 29 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 38 (1964). Suburban life-styles may be more a matter of these class
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The thesis of this Note is that recent Supreme Court voting rights
decisions render this delegation unconstitutional as a deprivation of
the rights guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
I.
Basic democratic principles require that men be able to participate
in making decisions that intimately affect their lives. The vote has
historically symbolized this right to participate, and it remains a nec-
essary tool for groups who seek to influence policy. Because of the
symbolic and substantive importance of the right to vote, the Supreme
Court has considered carefully the permissible bases of complete ex-
clusion from voting in a given jurisdiction. Restrictions on the fran-
chise have varied through time; qualifications of age, citizenship,
lack of criminal record, literacy, and residency are still traditional in
most states.3 The Court has not considered challenges to all of these
restrictions. Where voter qualifications have been challenged, however,
the Court's guiding principle has been that the state may not deny
the vote to persons substantially affected by the outcome of an election
and capable of voting intelligently and responsibly in it.
Thus in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,4 the
Court recognized that "[i]lliterate people may be intelligent voters,",,
but sustained a literacy requirement for voting on the grounds that
differences than of any inherent locational effects. See B. BERGER, WORKING CLASS SUawUR(1960).
Racial exclusion is a characteristic, if not alwa)s a purpose, of suburban living. The
ratio of the percentage of blacks in suburbs to the percentage of blacks in cities is only
.22 in the Northeast and .20 in the North Central U.S., but rises to .60 in the South,
reflecting the historic absence of residential barriers there. Brazer, Economic and Social
Disparities Between Central Cities and Their Suburbs, 43 LAND EcoN. 294 (1967). Ac-
cording to the 1967 trial census, the City of New Haven's population is 22% black. Or-
ange, a town of about 10,000, near New Haven, had a black population of 16 in 1967.
Indeed, no suburb of New Haven had a black population of over 2% in that year. Ham.
den, which is about 2% black, is lily-white except for an old section abutting on New
Haven. 'Tor many persons ... a large minimum lot requirement has become the symbol
of a community anti-Negro policy." AsRucAN Socitrr OF PLANNING Om ArS, Pnoat.is
OF ZONING AND LAND-UsE REGULATION 20 (Natl Commn on Urban Problems, Research
Rep. No. 2, 1968). [Hereinafter cited as ASPO.]
3. Thus property ownership was at one time a prerequisite for voting. "(I]t was
assumed that power belonged, as a right, to men who . . . had proved their worth
by acquiring property and to no others." J. GALRA'rH, TrE NEw INDusriuAL STATE 52
(1967).
[I]t was probably accepted ... that people with some property have a deeper stake
in community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more educated, more
knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means. ....
Harper v. Virginia Ed. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 685 (1966) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
4. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
5. Id. at 52.
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literacy "has some relation" to intelligent use of the ballot.0 In Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections,7 on the other hand, the Court in-
validated the Virginia poll tax as an "invidious discrimination"
against people without means because "[w]ealth . . . is not germane
to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process."
In Carrington v. Rash,0 the Court invalidated a Texas statute which
prevented persons entering the state as soldiers from acquiring a vot-
ing residence in the state during their period of military service. The
state claimed in effect that military personnel might not make respon-
sible use of the ballot if under the dominating influence of a com-
manding officer, and that, as transients without a stake in the future
of the area, soldiers might vote against needed bond issues and prop-
erty taxes. The Court did not deny the state's right to condition the
vote upon bona fide residency in a district, but held that soldiers could
not be conclusively presumed to be transients. The Court thus im-
plicitly overruled the state's determination that resident soldiers could
not make intelligent use of the ballot and/or did not have a sufficient
stake to vote responsibly in local elections. To the state's claim that
military personnel might vote against needed taxes, the Court re-
sponded: "'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population
because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible."'1
Last term, in Cipriano v. City of Houma," the Court invalidated
a Louisiana law which gave property owners alone the right to vote
in elections called to approve a municipal utility's issuance of revenue
bonds. The bonds were to be paid out of receipts from higher rates
rather than from property taxes. The state claimed that utility opera-
tions directly affected property values, thus giving owners a special
interest in the outcome of the election. The Court obviously thought
that the only substantial effect was the rate change, which would affect
owners and nonowners alike. It unanimously held, therefore, that
the statute unconstitutionally excluded "otherwise qualified voters
who are as substantially affected and directly interested in the matter
voted upon as are those permitted to vote."'1 2 The Court noted, how-
ever, that it reserved decision "whether a State might, in some circum-
stances, limit the franchise to those 'primarily interested.' "18
6. Id. at 51.
7. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
8. Id. at 668.
9. 380 US. 89 (1965).
10. Id. at 94.
11. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
12. Id. at 706.
13. Id. at 704 n-5.
898
Vol. 79: 896, 1970
The Constitutionality of Local Zoning
Kramer v. Union Free School District,'- decided the same day as
Cipriano, at first glance appears to present such a case. The state statute
restricted voting in school board elections to resident adult citizens
who were also property owners, lessees, or parents of children in
district schools. Schools were financed partially through local property
taxes set by the school board. Appellant, a 31 year-old bachelor, had
no children. He lived with his parents and paid neither rent nor
local property taxes. Without accepting petitioner's arguments as to
the basis of his interest, 5 the Court held without explanation that
Mr. Kramer was "interested in and affected by school board deci.
sions."'16 The state's claim that it might nevertheless restrict the vote
to those primarily interested in and directly affected by the outcome
of the election, though conceded by the Court, was brushed aside on
the ground that appellant was not "substantially less interested or
affected than those the statute includes."'17 In holding this distinction
among district residents to be without substance, the Court hinted
that all residents must be allowed to vote on every issue.' 8
But as Justice Stewart queried in dissent, why draw the line here?
A New Jersey commuter may have as great a stake in a New York City
election as a resident does, and a 20 year-old college student "may be
both better informed and more passionately interested in political af-
fairs than many adults."'91 Therefore, Justice Stewart argued, if this
appellant "must be given a decision-making role.., then it seems to
me that any individual who seeks such a role must be given it."2°
Such a result would of course be absurd; other interests intervene
14. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
15. Kramer asserted a substantial interest in school board elections based on the
effect of property taxes on the price of goods and services in the community and on the
general interest of community residents in the quality and structure of public education.
16. 395 U.S. at 632 n.15.
17. Id. at 632. The Court reasoned that the statute was both over-indusive and under-
inclusive; it allowed "uninterested" or uninformed people to vote, but did not allow
some "interested" and informed people to vote. It compared Mr. Kramer's position with
that of "an uninterested unemployed young man who pa)s no state or federal taxes,
but who rents an apartment in the district." Id. at 632 n.15. The Court no'here ex-
plained what it meant by "interest," but one is tempted to condude that ome notion
inclusive; it allowed "uninterested" or uninformed people to vote, but did not allow
of psychological effect was accepted. Compare A. BicE,, TnE Sursux= Counr AzD TBE
IDEA OF PROGRESS 164-65 (1970).
18. Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis alwa)s pose the
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which
substantially affect their lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the
right to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the
franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary
to promote a compelling state interest.
395 U.S. at 626-27.
19. Id. at 637.
20. Id. at 641.
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to limit the principle of universal suffrage in all elections. In partic-
ular, state interests are served by the convenience and efficiency of
local administration of purely local matters.21
Although the state legislature could choose to govern all matters
within its jurisdiction directly, states have always delegated power
over certain local affairs to locally elected bodies. Local decision.
making is thought to be more democratic, more responsive to local
needs, and ultimately more efficient than centralized governance would
be.22 Local governments, because they have a smaller polity, are better
able than larger jurisdictions to encourage directly democratic prac-
tices. 23 Local governments with general powers over a given territory
also provide a feeling of community.
A significant benefit derived from local responsiveness and flexibility
is diversity. Many decisions have primarily local significance, yet must
be made by all communities. Giving each community power to order
its own consumption choices from the common menu not only en-
courages innovation and experimentation, but also allows individuals
a greater opportunity to satisfy their own preferences. Individuals may
and do seek out communities which share their views on schools,
parks, recreation, neighborliness, and the "proper" level of public
spending. The ability of local governments to satisfy communally
idiosyncratic desires thus soothes tensions connected with lifestyle
choices which would otherwise surface at the state level, and enables
our consensual system of politics to work more smoothly.
So long as local decisions have only local effects, the state's interest
21. This is not to suggest that the state might ignore the right to representation at
the local level. At one time the fact that cities are "creatures" of the state was thought
to give states unlimited discretion in providing for local representation. However, III
Avery v. Midland County, 390 US. 474 (1968), the Supreme Court held that, given the
importance of local governments in the areal division of powers, the state could not
deny equal representation at the local level. Both the Cipriano and Kramer cases ex-
tended this constitutional requirement to special-purpose local units,
22. Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for a "Proper" Areal Division of Governmental Powers,
in AMaA AND POWER 27, 32 (A. Mass. ed., 1969), Ylvisaker does not think local government
particularly efficient. But see A. DEToQUEviLI, DEmOCACY ni AMEIUCA, Vol, I, ch. V(1835).
23. It is hard to quarrel with a myth. But see R. WooD, supra note 2, at 195, 197:[S]uburban municipalities represent the principle of direct popular political partici-
pation in a mode theoretically workable under modern circumstances. . . . Each
suburbanite is expected to undertake the responsibilities of citizenship on his own
initiative and determine the common good by himself. . . . The theory is that lie
has created a democratic haven in which a consensus of right-thinking men replace
a compromise among partisan-thinking men .... If faithfully followed, the theory
would demand so much of his time, so great a communion with his neighbors,
so high a competence in public affairs, as to be nearly all-consuming. For most
suburbanites, the feasible way out is indifference, as revealed by apathy in local
elections.
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in delegating power to local units does not conflict with the individual's
right to participate in making decisions which affect him. The deci-
sion to construct a town library is an example of this type of issue.
Substantially all resources expended will be raised within the juris-
diction, and the facility will service primarily town residents. Further-
more, one town's decision to build or not to build does not narrow
the range of consumption choices open to citizens of other towns.
These other towns have powers formally equal to those of the first,
and the materials necessary for construction are equally available to
them. Outsider interests are therefore likely to be negligible.24
Of course an individual may prefer the choice of a neighboring
town on one issue. A voter in Town A, for example, may claim to be
affected by Town B's decision on the library because he desires a
library and Town A has refused to build one. It is not expected that
any individual will be happy with all his town's choices, but rather
that he be given an equal chance to determine the distribution of
town resources among many possible alternative activities. Each town
might be viewed as a family faced with the same spending choices and
a budget constraint. The virtue of delegating power to local units
to make choices among a given set of consumption possibilities is
that more individual preferences may be satisfied. If an individual is
enough out of tune with the majority's priorities in his community,
he may be able to find and join a community in which his values are
shared.
The state's interest in granting local home rule powers-encouraging
Even in rural areas, dependence on higher levels of government has vitiated claims to
local independence. In "Springdale," for example, a "high proportion of the village
budget represents subsidies from the state government.... [TJhe local governing agency
finds itself in a position of having surrendered its legal jurisdictions to outside agencies."
A. VmICH & J. BENSMrAN, SMLLL TowN iN MAss SocLEmrT 113 (1958). Compare, on the other
hand, ASPO, supra note 2, at 9:
The intense local interest in zoning questions demonstrates that land use is a sub-ject in which dtizens are vitally interested and one which fosters citizen participation
in government, although that participation is often more emotional than intellectual.
As authority over land use is shifted from local to regional control, so does self-
determination shift away from the people affected. The importance of local autonomy
in land-use control-both as to the problems it creates and the desirability of
preserving it--should not be underestimated.
24. Throughout this Note "nonresident" means one who does not live within the
corporate limits of a municipality under discussion, but who does live in the same state.
Consideration of interstate problems, e.g., freedom of travel, is beyond the scope of this
Note. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 US. 160
(1941). Regarding interstate residency requirements for voting, see Note, Residence Re.
quirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 COLUU. 1. Rv., 134 (1970). See also Note,
The Impact and Constitutionality of Voter Residence Requirements as Applied to Certain
Intrastate Movers, 43 IND. L.J. 901 (1968) (arguing the right of intrastate movers to vote
in elections where they have the requisite stake and information).
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innovation and satisfying lifestyle preferences--thus rests on two as-
sumptions. The first is that locally idiosyncratic behavior can be
avoided by individuals who do not "fit in." Should local units be
granted the power to exclude individuals they do not want, however,
individuals would be unable to choose to join communities which
most satisfy their own lifestyle preferences. The promise of diversity
would become a straitjacket of local conformity, with change pre-
cluded by one group's exclusion of all others.2"
The second and more important assumption in the argument for
delegation is that all communities have resources equally available to
them, i.e. that they make choices in approximately the same market
(although not necessarily with the same budget constraint). Where
one town is given more power than others over critical state resources,
the justification for local delegation again does not hold. The legis-
lature could not give one locality the power to make all state budget-
ing decisions.26 Similarly, where one set of towns has available, through
topographical accident, nontransferable (immobile, nonreproducible)
resources that others do not, delegation of power to control these re-
sources is questionable.2 7 Suppose, for example, that Long Island were
accessible to mainland New York at only one point. State delegation
of control over access to that point to the municipality in which it
falls would be akin to delegation of state budgeting decisions. An up.
stream town by the same reasoning should not be given power to de-
cide whether to dump sewage in the river heedless of the interests of
25. There is also some reason to think that local exclusion of "undesirables" might be
unconstitutional. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), the majority of tile
Supreme Court, basing its decision on the commerce clause, held that California couhl
not exclude indigents from the state. In so holding the Court declared that a state
might not "isolate itself from difficulties common to all [states]." Id. at 17. Compare
Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965), invalidating
Easttown's four-acre minimum lot size ordinance and declaring that the township could not
"stand in the way of the natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto
undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live."
In Edwards the Court also noted that entry was a prerequisite for those excluded to
work for a change in state policies. 314 US. at 174. In the local case we are not fated
with the context of interstate travel. The Court has declared, however, that a town may
not exclude unwanted newcomers because of the way they might vote, Carrlngton v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). In any event, exclusionary practices undermine the justifita-
tion for delegated powers.
26. Examples of such attempted delegation are obviously lacking. But when the
Tennessee legislature attempted to confer general governmental powers on a town over
land beyond its city limits, the delegation was held unlawful. Malone v. Williams, 118
Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907). See infra note 67.
27. States often remove power from local hands when local governments cannot solve
regional problems. Thus, for example, when the cities and towns ringing San Prancieo
Bay were unable or unwilling to act individually to control filling and dredging of
the Bay, the state created a state agency to perform the task. See Comment, San Ftrancisco
Bay: Regional Regulation for Its Protection and Development, 55 CALMF. L. REV. 728
(1967).
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towns downstream, since such power is tantamount to eminent do-
main over a common (nontransferable) resource. Beach communities
which would restrict beach access only to municipal residents also fall
within this prohibition. Vacant land, also scarce and nontransferable
in many regions, constitutes still another such resource.28
Consideration of these issues in a voting rights context yields similar
conclusions. When one locality is able to exercise power over the
citizens of another political unit, by determining how scarce state re-
sources shall be used, the state's delegation of power becomes an
enfranchisement as well as a districting decision. The town's decision
to dump sewage in the river is one in which individuals in towms
downstream are likely to be vitally interested and competently in-
formed. Similarly, suburban control of the use and development of
vacant land vitally affects unrepresented outsiders.
II.
As a result of suburban zoning, an amount of land greater than
what the market would otherwise demand 0 or what is adequate
for health and safety, 0 is required for the production of all types of
housing units. Housing which requires a small amount of land per
unit generally is either forbidden or sharply restricted in quantity.31
The effects of restrictive use regulations are threefold. The first
effect of restrictive regulation is on the relative price of land for
costly and inexpensive housing. By forbidding or sharply curbing
28. Other such resources obviously exist, e.g., oyster-beds. See Brackshaw v. Lankford,
73 Md. 428, 21 A. 66 (1891), infra note 66.
29. For a thorough economic analysis see Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418(1969). On the politics of local zoning boards see Makielski, Zoning: Legal Theory and
Political Practice, 45 J. URBAN L. 1 (1967); R. BABcoCr, Tim ZoNINo GAME (1936). Zoning
may be an important political issue, as in the 1964 Hamden, Connecticut, election, where
the successful mayoral candidate campaigned on a slogan of "no more apartments.'
30. The Connecticut Health Department recommends lot sizes of one acre for land
-without sanitary sewers. This is the largest lot size requirement for health or safety
known to the author. The provision of sanitary sewers is obviously within the town's
power. That it chooses not to provide such services may in itself be an exclusionary
device. A new Pennsylvania decision explicitly rejects lack of sewyers as a justification
for large lot zoning. See In re: Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., No. 218 (Pa. Sup. Ct.,
Feb. 24, 1970).
31. Almost half the land in the New York City Region in 1960 was zoned for single
family development on one acre or more per unit. REGIONAL PLAN AsN, supra note 1, at
12. The trend in the past decade has been towards increasing restrictions. In fairly
sparsely settled suburbs, however, landowners may still have enough power to make
"upzoning" a controversial issue. See J. Hyman, Large Lot Zoning in Monroe, Connecticu.t:
A Study of Decision Making in a Suburban Town (Senior Studies Paper on file in
Yale Law School Library, 1968).
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small-lot or apartment house development, these regulations limit the
market for the land so regulated, thus reducing its price per unit
area for permissible uses and raising the price of the limited supply
of land available for other purposes. Let us consider land as a simple
commodity, desired for itself alone. A man who wants to buy an acre
of land in unregulated Town A must compete with buyers who want
quarter-acre lots, half-acre lots, two-acre lots, etc. He must compete
for this land not only with buyers who want to erect single family
homes, but also with the apartment house developer and possibly
with commercial and industrial users. In Town B, zoned entirely for
single family development on lots at least one acre in size, the one-acre
buyer has little competition. With diminished demand, prices drop.
This simple model requires two qualifications. First, land is not
desired for itself, but as a component in a consumer product,
"housing."32 Purchasers want to buy what is called a "building lot,"
rather than a commodity called "land." This implies that land prices
will rise less than proportionately with acreage where regulation
excludes bidders for smaller lots from the market, since what is pri-
marily desired is a plot on which one may construct a house. Thus
a study of actual sales in Greenwich, Connecticut, found that lots in
the four-acre-minimum zone sold for the same amount as lots in the
one-acre-minimum zone. Of course, lot prices more often do vary
with size, even if not proportionately, and therefore add to the cost
of a house.33
32. Consumers do not get satisfaction from purchasing so many bricks, so many boards,
so much land and so big a septic tank. Rather, they purchase a complex of housing
"services" in which land is one necessary factor of production. Consumer utility from
this complex "good,' similarly, is not simple. One requires housing services to produce
various characteristics in some minimum quantity, e.g., heat, spaciousness, privacy,
shelter from storms. To produce housing at all, a minimum quantity of certain Inputs
will be required. Thereafter, to produce any composite level of satisfaction, a number
of combinations of inputs might suffice. Thus some land will be needed for any housing
unit. Within a given budget constraint, extensive use of land may produce certain de-
sired housing characteristics. As the land becomes more expensive, consumers may sub-
stitute other inputs for it, continuing to maximize satisfaction (though the composite
level of satisfaction is likely to be less after the land price rise). Similarly, as more land
is required because of government regulation, the consumer will be less able to allocate
resources to other inputs and the composite level of satisfaction achievable Is likely to
decline. For an elegant theoretical treatment see Lancaster, A New Approach to Con-
sumer Theory, 74 J. oF PoLrncAL ECONOMY 182 (1966).
83. 1958 prices in the B3oston area were as follows:
4 acres: $1900 1 acre: $1200
3 acres: $1750 .5 acre: $1000
2 acres: $1550 .25 acre: $750
1.5 acres: $1420 .15 acre: $500
URBAN LAND INsTi mT, THE E rEcTs OF LARGE LOT SizE ON R EsIDENTIAL DavELormENr 23
(Technical Bull. No. 82, July, 1958). See also NEW DicrnoNs, supra note 1, at 207;
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BuILDiNG THE AMIaucAN CITY 214 (1969)
(prices in Greenwich, Conn., St. Louis County, Mo., and Montgomery County, Md.).
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The second qualification to the simple model is that some people
may be willing to pay for exclusivity. They will pay more, in other
words, for two acres in a two acre zone than in an unregulated or less
restrictive area. In an unregulated market, consumers desiring exclu-
sivity must buy their land in competition with other bidders and must
in addition pay the transaction costs incident to securing restrictive
covenants from their neighbors to guarantee continuing exclusivity.
Alternatively, they must acquire a great deal more land, in order to
shield themselves from less wealthy neighbors. Regulation eliminates
these transaction costs. These consumers are now willing to pay more
for the land itself, but less than the previous cost of the land plus
transaction costs. They too receive a windfall.
Conversely, buyers who wanted, say, quarter acre lots must look
elsewhere. For them the suburb has reduced the total supply of land
available. Ceteris paribus, the price of land for these other purposes
will rise. The magnitude of the price rise will depend on the propor-
tion of available land covered by the restrictive regulations. In this
way regulation has subsidized large-lot development at the cost of
small-lot and apartment house users, and constitutes a subsidy to the
rich paid by the less wealthy.
The second effect of restrictive regulation is to induce some people
to buy more land than they otherwise would, thus reducing the ab-
solute supply of land available for other residential development.
By reducing the absolute supply of land available in the short run,
regulation raises land prices for all users.34 Consider the couple who
wanted to purchase one half acre of land and construct a house. Sup-
pose that, prior to regulation, a half acre cost $2000 and one acre cost
$3800. After regulation, half acres are unavailable. Say that one acre
lots now cost $2500, reflecting their projected use as building lots,
the absence of half-acre purchaser competition, and some premium
paid by those hunting exclusivity. The couple now has a choice:
spend $500 extra for a lot or forego purchase altogether. Some couples
will be priced out of the market by this increase in costs; other couples
will purchase the one acre. This inducement to purchase more land
than one otherwise would buy reduces the supply of land available
to meet remaining demand. This artificially decreased supply tends
to raise prices for all land.
Third, in the long run, the effect of restrictive regulation on the
34. The argument here is that all prices will rise, but the argument above states
that, due to the shift in demand caused by the regulation, prices will rise unevenly.
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supply of land available for residential uses, and hence on general
price levels for land, may be considered in two ways. One may assume
that the supply of land is absolutely inelastic. Insofar as land use
patterns are stable, suburban regulation is then tantamount to "using
up" or "distributing" a resource whose supply is absolutely limited.
Extensive use of land now implies less land available for future de-
velopment.
The supply of developable land is not, of course, absolutely but
only relatively inelastic. The total stock of land is enormous,1 and
"developable" land is slowly "produced" from this stock 80 Suburban
action affects not only the quantity of land consumers must buy,
but also the rate at which that land is produced.37
The "production" of land for residential development depends on
many exogenous and unrelated variables, such as alternative oppor-
tunities for investment and the general level of demand for housing.
Three important factors are related to the land itself: (1) physical
characteristics, (2) location, and (3) available services.88 These situa-
tional factors will affect the supply of land forthcoming at any given
price level.39
35. Some urbanists predict that we will continue to use up land at an even more rapid
rate as our spatial relationships change with different means of communication and
transportation. See, e.g., Webber, The Post-City Age, 97 DAEDALUS 1091 (1968); Webber,
Order in Diversity: Community without Propinquity, in CITIEs AND SPAC E 23 (L. Wingo
ed. 1963).
36. Developable land, as used here, is vacant, uncommitted land suitable for rest.
dential construction at some density. See M. GAFFNEY, POLICIES AND PRACrICES AFFECTING
URBAN LAND COSTS AS AN ELE ET OF HOUSING Cos (Study S-324, Institute for Defense
Analysis, 1968).
37. The case of fixed supply is thus the limiting case of the low production model.
Whatever the model, prices have risen drastically. The value of all urban land has been
estimated to have doubled between 1950 and 1965, rising fivefold or more in areas of
Aid growth. PRESIDENT'S CoAMrrrmE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HomE 141 (1969).
Analyzing the cause of increases in the cost of lots ready to be built upon in the San
Francisco area, Maisel found 52% of increased lot prices due to rising unit coats of raw
land alone (with 28% attributable to higher development costs, 20% to larger lot sizes),
Id. at 140. Another study, reported in NEw DIREariONs. supra note 1, at 207, found that
lot sizes in the Bay Area had increased 15-20% in area but 100-150% in price, while lotg
in Los Angeles had increased 25% in area and 250% in price. As a result of skyrocketing
increases in land prices, land costs as a component of housing unit cost increased froin
12% to 20% between 1950 and 1965. A DECENT HOME, supra, at 120, 140 [data of FlHA
1 203 homes]. The current ratio of land to total costs may be more on the order of 25%,
A DECENT HOME at 118. Thus in twenty years the relative cost of the land Input iII
housing production has about doubled.
38. See generally, Kaiser, Locational Decision Factors in a Producer Model of Resi-
dential Development, 44 IANe ECON. 351 (1968).
39. See M. GArFNEY, supra note 36, at 8.9. Gaffney daims that land prices do not
serve to bring land into the market. Being "brought into the market" requires the
existence of public works. These public works are not undertaken because of landowner
--pressure in a given area, and are outside individual control. The "production" of land
then becomes a dependent variable, with the decision to undertake infrastructural de.
velopments the exogenous variable.
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Man has little control over the physical characteristics of raw land.
Some locational characteristics may be affected by government, but
often only at a level removed from local control, as in the case of
highway construction. Installation of city streets giving access to the
center of town from hinterland areas, on the other hand, may be a
decision subject to substantial municipal control.
Local governments do have a substantial degree of control over
which services are available to the potential developer. Among these
services, water and sanitary sewers are of primary importance. If a
city or town does not provide these services, (1) the land may be
developed, but more expensively than might otherwise be possible,40
through installation of a private sewer system; or (2) the land will be
developed, but more extensively than otherwise possible, in order to
accommodate septic tanks and/or wells; or (3) the land will not be
developed at all.41
Insofar as it restricts the production of developable land, either
through inaction or the prohibition of private initiative, the town
further contributes to rising land prices within and without munici-
pal limits. When a number of suburbs which control production and
development of residential land consciously mimic each other in this
manner, the price and supply of such land are substantially affected.&4
The regulation of developable land can be distinguished from other
municipal decisions on several grounds. First, land-use regulations
affect disinterested outsiders much more than other municipal deci-
sions. Other resources do not generally have as inelastic a supply func-
tion as land. Increased demand for teachers can, for example, be met
from virtually a nation-wide market, while building lots are neither
mobile nor easily produced. In addition, zoning regulations in one
town tend to elicit similar efforts to maintain exclusivity from neigh-
40. Sewer systems are prone to economies of scale because of the heavy investment
needed in a disposal plant. A growing town might thus find it cheaper in the long run
to install a municipal sewer system. Downing, Extension of Sewer Serice at the Aurat-
Urban Fringe; 45 LAND ECON. 103 (1969).
41. Orange, Connecticut falls into the latter category. The town has a great deal of
level land. It is zoned in one uniform zone: single family development on lots of at
least one acre. Land at the western edge has poor drainage, so that even the one acre
minimum does not make it possible to develop the land without sewers. The toun has
refused on several occasions to take such action, and no private sewer system has been
built The land remains vacant.
42. If land were distributed homogeneously among all towns, local regulation of
land use would give each citizen some say in how land is to be developed. Local control
of zoning ostensibly implies just such a system of decentralized but equitably distributed
-power. However, development of land at the city core is costly and often unfeasible
without government aid, particularly since residential uses must compete with commercial
and industrial uses for space in the center city.
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boring towns, and therefore produce a correspondingly large shift in
the use of land resources. Finally, and probably most important, when
suburban towns regulate land use they affect a substantial part of the
supply of vacant land. Suburbanites do not control so great a propor-
tion of other resources, and the effect on the market of regulations
affecting other resources is therefore not likely to be as great.
Land use regulations also have a greater exclusionary effect than
other ordinances. Although theoretically any increase in the cost of
living in the town would tend to discourage persons of lesser means
from settling there, the increased costs resulting from zoning regula-
tions are likely to be greater than the costs imposed by other munici-
pal activities. The relative importance of zoning as a barrier to entry
is underscored by the fact that despite generally higher levels of mu-
nicipal services, including education, suburban communities often
have lower tax rates than adjoining cities. 43
Thus land use regulations, as used by suburban municipalities, have
two extraterritorial effects. First, they affect the price of land outside
municipal borders. Second, by prohibiting certain uses and requiring
extensive and expensive use of land for other purposes, suburbs ex-
clude people who would otherwise want to buy the land and reside in
the town. In addition, the suburbs' virtual monopoly over vacant land
and their tendency toward parallel action ensure that land use regu-
lations have a greater impact than regulations concerning any other
resource.
III.
Existing law provides two ready responses to challenges to local
zoning control on constitutional grounds. The first is that the Supreme
Court already considered and approved zoning's extraterritorial effects
fifty years ago in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.;44 and the second, that
grants of similar, directly extraterritorial powers involving annexa-
tion and police regulation have been held valid.
A. The Euclid Case
At the beginning of this century, a number of communities enacted
comprehensive zoning ordinances on the authority of their home rule
43. Suburbs do not have free riders; cities do-commuting suburbanites. Suburba also
have fewer needy people and therefore need not provide certain services. Most Important,
suburbs often have higher assessed valuatioa of property per resident and thus may tax
at a lower rate to get the same result.
See generally, Coons, Cline & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Consti.
tutional Test for State Finandal Structures, 57 CAtiF. L. REV. 807 (1969).
44. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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powers.4 5 These efforts were invalidated as ultra vires the munici-
pality.4 6 In so holding, many courts dealt only with the lack of express
state authorization,4 7 concluding that the general grant of power to
regulate local affairs did not imply a novel power like zoning 8 Very
45. For examples of home rule powers, see, e.g., CALIF. CONSr. art. XI, § II (1879):
Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such
local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.
To similar effect, WAshm CoNsr. art. XI, § 11; OHIO CONsr. art. XVIII, § 3. Sandalow,
The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L.
REv. 643, 645, n.9 (1964), lists 28 States with some constitutional provision concerning
municipal home rule. Statutory grants may be supplemental to constitutional provisions,
e.g., N.C. GFN. STATS. §§ 160-353 to -363 (1964), or may stand alone, e.g., N.Y. MUNIcIPAL
Hom RuLE LAw (Kinney 1969). Sandalow suggests, at 668-71, that home-rule pov.ers be
characterized not as constitutional or statutory, a distinction which in practice has little
relevance, but rather as broad or narrowly specific grants of power. See also I R ANDex.
soN, AhmucAN LAW OF ZONInG § 3.07, at 135 (1 63). One might distinguish between
1) the power to draw up a charter specifying the form and structure of local govern-
ment, 2) authorization to exercise local police powers, and 3) limitations on state au-
thority to intrude in the municipal domain. N. LirLFL, MlroPoLiTAN An A Prou-
LEm AND MumcIPAL HomE RuLE 15-21 (1962). It should be noted that home-rule powers
determine only the extent of unilateral municipal action, not the bounds within which
the state may, as it chooses, delegate powers to the municipalities.
46. Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 P. 828 (1914) (grant of general police po.-es
not sufficient); Shad v. Fowler, 90 Fla. 155, 105 So. 733 (1925) (general wvelare powers not
sufficient to infer zoning power); Downey v. Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125
(1929) (exclusion of apartments, not pursuant to comprehensive ordinance specified in
enabling act, held void as without authorization); Calvo v. City of New Orleans, 136 La.
480, 67 So. 338 (1915) (power to exclude all business from residential area not conferred
by grant of power to regulate businesses detrimental to health); Clements v, McCabe,
210 Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722 (1920) (power to pass legislation "relating to its municipal
concerns" does not confer zoning power); State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, S01
Mlo. 1, 256 S.V. 474 (1923) (power to exclude ice manufacturing from industrial area
not conferred by grant of power to regulate businesses detrimental to health); City of
St. Louis v. Eviaiff, 301 fo. 231, 256 S.W. 489 (1923) (companion case to .fKelvey re
junkyard-same result).
Occasionally a court declared zoning itself to be beyond the scope of the state police
power. Fitzhugh v. City of Jackson, 132 Miss. 585, 97 So. 190 (1923). Upon motion for
rehearing in the McKelvey case, supra, the court appeared to hold that the attempted
delegation was beyond the state's power because zoning (without compensation) was in-
legal. 256 S.W. 474, 483-85 (1923).
47. Express authorization is needed because there is no inherent right to local rel.f-
government, despite occasional suggestions to the contrary. See Mclain, The Doctrine
of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 CoLt. L. REv. 299 (1916). J. Forna im,
LocAL Gova'aEsrx LAW 43 (1949). "The city is the creature of the State." Worcester
v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1905). The powers of these
"creatures," as stated in Dillon's Rule, are:
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in
or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplish-
ment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply con-
venient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the
existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation....
J. DILLON, Coa ENrTAus ON THE LAXw OF AUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS 448.50 (5th ed. 1911).
48. While the cases cited in support of this proposition are of early vintage, the
proposition remains valid and its impact is noticeable in the later cases involving
municipal attempts to zone under general delegations of police power, without sup-
port from specific zoning enabling statutes, and in litigation resulting from the use
of general police power rather than from authority granted by the zoning enabling
acts.
1 R. ANnwmsoN, supra note 45, § 3.10, at 140. Anderson has collected recent cases illus-
trating his point.
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rarely, however, did courts reach the issue of whether the power
claimed was local in nature.49
Given the courts' quo warranto approach, proponents of zoning
successfully pushed for the passage of specific enabling acts.50 Chal-
lenges to comprehensive enabling acts were also numerous, but
yielded little comment regarding zoning's areal impact.r1
In Euclid itself, the Ambler Realty Co. never directly challenged
the state's right to delegate zoning power to the municipality, asserting
instead that zoning was invalid whether grounded in implied home-
rule powers or in the recently enacted Enabling Act. 2 Since the state
49. But see State ex rel. Ekern v. City of Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 633, 209 N.W. 860
(1926) (municipal regulation of building heights under home-rule power over "local
affairs" sustained). The court held that the height of buildings was of statewlide concern,
in that health and safety regulations promote the good of the "community at large."
Nevertheless, it declared, many matters of statewvide concern affected "the people and the
state at large somewhat remotely and indirectly, yet at the same time affect the In-
dividual municipalities directly and intimately," and can therefore be characterized as
"local" for purposes of construing home-rule powers. 209 N.W. at 862.
50. E. BAssErr, ZONING 14-17 (1940); J. MrMNBAUM, TnE LAW Or ZONING 181-82
(1930). By January, 1926, when the Supreme Court heard the Euclid case, 43 states and
the United States Congress (for the District of Columbia) had passed such enabling acts.
Brief by Bettman as Amicus Curiae at 5, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. D65 (1926).
There are today zoning enabling acts in all 50 states. See generally, R. ANDErSON & 11,
ROSWIG, PLANNING, ZONING, & SUBDIVISION: A SUMMARY OF STATUTORY LAW IN rIl 50
STATES (1966); HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, COMPARATiVE DIGEST OF MUNICII'AL
AND- COUNTY ZONING ENABLING STATUTES (1953). Where zoning enthusiasts were strong
enough, especially when courts were slow to accept zoning, constitutional amendments
art. II, § 25; GA. CONsr. art. 3, § 7, para. 25; NJ. CoNsr. art. IV, § 6, para. 2. Louisiana
went so far as to delegate the power directly in the constitution. LA. CoNsv. art. 1-1,
§ 29. Since the delegation of power to municipalities is challenged in this paper on
federal constitutional grounds, there is no need to distinguish between bare statutory
grants and those backed up by state constitutional amendment.
51. Most challenges attacked the substantive power of any government to zone and
regulate the use of property even where nuisances or uses detrimental to health were
not involved. References to areal impact of a statute are oblique. Thus in Dawley v.
Collingivood, 242 Mich. 247, 218 N.W. 766 (1928), the court ruled that a town did not
havb to amend its charter in order to exercise zoning powers pursuant to an enabling
act. In passing, the court said (at 249):
It is fundamental that the Legislature has power to delegate to cities authority to
enact such ordinances as are essential or incident to local governmental functions.
In Maine the State Supreme Court rendered an advisory opinion that the pending
enabling act would be valid, declaring:
The underlying question, then, is whether the Legislature may delegate to the legis-
lative bodies of cities authority to exercise the Police power. Of this we have no
doubt.
In re Opinion of the Justices, 124 Me. 501, 128 A. 181, 184-85 (1925) (holding, however,
that the enabling act represented merely the delegation of the police power, and ex-
pressly declaring that this was not zoning). The enabling act was passed, Euclid Ivas
then decided, and in York Harbor Village v. Libby, 126 Me. 537, 140 A. 382 (1929) the
Maine court upheld zoning under the enabling act. It is not dear how the court would
have reacted if the Euclid case had not already cleared its way.
52. Oto GEN. CODE, §§ 4366-1 to -12 (1919) (enabling act); Oio CoNsY. art. XVIII,§ 5:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government
and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.
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is often granted power to delegate expressly even nonlocal powers,
whereas home-rule grants are restricted to local affairs, Ambler's fail-
ure to distinguish between the two statutes in attacking the zoning
power apparently indicates an assumption that zoning had only local
impact.
In what it termed the "main question" of the case, however, Ambler
seems to have raised the localness issue directly53 Ambler argued that
a municipality may not, under the guise of the police power, ar-
bitrarily divert property from its appropriate and most econom-
ical use .... Nor can... a municipality resist the operation of
economic laws, and remain rural, exclusive and aesthetic, when its
land is needed to be otherwise developed by that larger public
good and public welfare, which takes into consideration the ex-
tent to which the prosperity of the country depends upon the
economic development of its business and industrial enterprises.
The municipal limits of the Village of Euclid are, after all, ar-
bitrary and accidental political lines .... If the Village of Euclid
may lawfully prefer to remain rural and restrict the normal in-
dustrial and business development of its land, each of the other
municipalities, circumadjacent to the City of Cleveland, may
pursue a like course. Thus the areas available for the expanding
industrial needs of the metropolitan city will be restricted, the
value of such land as is left available artificially enhanced and
industry driven to less advantageous sites. 4
The extraterritorial argument is there, but both the realty company
and the district court55 confused it with a laissez-faire challenge of the
government's power to channel property uses. The district court's
emphasis on Euclid Avenue's "natural" development for industrial
and commercial uses 5 and Ambler's phrase, the land's "appropriate
and most economical uses," implied that the town might not divert
or channel market-dictated development of the land within its borders.
Ambler declared that under either provision the test of validity would be udhether or
not the village's ordinance
is a reasonable and real exercise of the police power or an unreasonable and ar-
bitrary exercise of the legitimate powers of local self-government and an inpairment
of the rights of property guaranteed to the appellees below by the Constitutions of
the United States and Ohio.
Brief for Appellees at 37.
53. Id. at 58-44.
54. Id. at 42-43.
55. 297 Fed. 507 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
56. Euclid avenue has become the great business and commerdal street of the
metropolitan area of Cleveland, and such, the evidence shows, is its natural, obvious,
and ultimate use within and beyond the village of Euclid.
297 Fed. at 309. The court also uses such phrases as "The evidence dearly shows that
the normal and reasonably to be expected use and development of plaintiffs land.. ." Id.
911
The Yale Law Journal
References to exclusion and regional disaster were made more to il.
lustrate the logical possibilities of regulation than to describe the
situation as it existed.
The Supreme Court did not have to reach these issues. Euclid was
not excluding industry, the majority noted, for the town had only
determined "not that industrial development shall cease at its bound-
aries, but that the course of such development shall proceed within
definitely fixed lines."5 7 Given this limited intervention in the market,
the Court saw no reason why the town might not "divert an industrial
flow from the course which it would follow, to the injury of the resi-
dential public if left alone, to another course where such injury will
be obviated."' 8 Having held that exclusion was not at issue and that
the channeling was benign, the Court brushed aside the regional
aspects of the case.
It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases
where the general public interest would so far outweigh the in-
terest of the municipality that the municipality would not be al-
lowed to stand in the way.50
In its brief, the Village of Euclid also confronted the areal impact
of its regulations. The village emphatically distinguished its commu-
nity-wide regulations from the "block ordinances" previously invali-
dated in several jurisdictions, 0 on the grounds that block ordinances
arbitrarily permit the residents of one district to dictate their neigh-
borhood's future without consideration of the community welfare.
The village zoning ordinance, on the other hand, was "a comprehen-
sive plan for ... the whole community,"' which distributed the ter-
ritory "among all the different uses."02
The Court implicitly agreed with the village that the municipality,
rather than the neighborhood or the region, was the "relevant mar-
ket" for considering land use regulations. As presented to the Court,
Euclid's regulations only distorted market locational preferences
within a small area. The regulations would have almost no effect on
the amount of land used for various purposes. Zoning would have an
obvious impact on individual fortunes within the town, but so long
57. 272 U.S. at 389.
58. Id. at 390.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 74, 111, 126; see Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); Kahn Bros. v.
Youngstown, 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925); Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 850, 285
S.W. 518 (1921).
61. Brief for Appellants at 49 (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 46.
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as the intramural decision-making process was fair, no claim of "gov-
ernment without representation" could be sustained.A With the issue
of extraterritoriality muted and confused, the Court in Euclid never
dealt with the representational problems created by the extraterri-
torial impact of local land control policies.4
B. Grants of Extraterritorial Powers
Grants of extraterritorial powers have long been sustained on the
theory that the "number, nature and duration of the powers conferred
upon [local governments] ... and the territory over which they shall
be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State."60 The tradi-
tional rule is that a state may 6 expressly grant specific non-local pow-
ers to local units of government.6 7
63. The Court, having determined that extraterritorial effects of the regulation would
be minimal, noted Euclid's political autonomy and powers of local self-government, em-
phasizing that the village's governing authorities presumably spoke the will of a majority
of the people in the town. 272 US. at 389.
64. The Court thus never had to deal with how "general" the "general velfare" must
be. The Court was reluctant to depart from a strict nuisance-health-safety rationale.
For example, the Court seemed to justify the segregation of apartment houses from
detached homes on the ground that apartments are
a mere parasite constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and
attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district.
Id. at 394. It felt constrained to add, however, that apartments "monopolize the rays
of the sun" and result in increased traffic, thus impairing the safety of the streets. ld.
The Court's opinion does imply approval of economic segregation, but sa)s nothing at
all about economic exclusion. At the end of its animadversion on apartments and their
ilk, the Court alludes to "favored localities" in which children have quiet and open
spaces in which to play, and implies that communities may attempt to secure these same
advantages for their own children through the regulation of residential land use.
65. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
66. Massachusetts, Maryland and Washington appear, however, to be rather strict in
construing which powers may be delegated by the legislature to local governments. In
Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 328 Mass. 674, 105 N.E.2d 565
(1952), the court held that the state could not grant localities the option of amending
their governmental structure, declaring the issue to be of statewide concern. The court
said that the only exception to the general non-delegability of legislative powers per-
taining to municipalities involved matters of "purely local interest." 328 Ma.s. at 676.
See also In re Municipal Suffrage to Women, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N.E. 488 (1894).
The Maryland rule is similar; see Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 172
Md. 667, 192 A. 531 (1937); Gaither v. Jackson, 147 Md. 655, 128 A. 769 (192); Bdflrdhaw
v. I.ankford, 73 Md. 428, 21 A. 66 (1891). Bradslaw is analogous to tie case of suburban
land controls. There the state delegated authority over oyster-gathering to residents of
one county. The court said that the oyster-beds in that county -were for the benefit of
the whole state, and that one county could not make decisions that affected the whole
state. But see Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 425, 240 A.2d 272 (1968), upholding
a local option law regarding local court structure. The court distinguihed the previous
line of cases, saying that a local law is just like a general one, only restricted in ter-
ritorial application.
The Washington constitution grants powers to local governments within their corporate
limits. In Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 261 P. 112 (1927) the court held
that the provision was limiting and that the legislature could not, therefore, delegate to
municlpalities the right to exercise extraterritoria police powers to ensure the purity
of the water supply. No other state appears to have quite so strict a doctrine.
The Kansas Constitution, art. Ir, § 21, also limits delegation of pow,-ers to matters of
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These grants have been of four major types, two of which are not
relevant here.68 The extraterritorial powers sometimes granted to
municipalities which raise substantial representational issues are an.
nexation and police powers.
1. Unilateral Annexation Powers
Since localities are only its creatures, the state is empowered to draw
local boundaries, 69 decree annexation or detachment of territory, 0 and
set standards for municipal growth, including annexation of incorpo-
rated and unincorporated territory. The great majority of annexation
statutes give some voice-even if only a remonstrance heard by a court
-to the interests of the residents in the area to be annexed."x Some
legislatures have, however, given municipalities unilateral power to
local legislation. It has been held that the control of soil drifting and the administration
of public schools may not be delegated to local governments. State ex rel. Perkins v.
Hardwick, 144 Kan. 3, 57 P.2d 1231 (1936); State ex rel. Donaldson v. Hines, 163 Kan.
300, 182 P.2d 865 (1947).
67. The delegation must be express and specific. A general grant of power over mu-
nicipal affairs or the like will almost never confer non-local powers. 6 McQuIILIN, MU.
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.57 (3rd ed. 1969). The only time a state attempted to give
a municipality all governmental powers over a territory outside the city limits, the stat-
ute was invalidated. Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907). See gen-
erally, F. SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRITORiAL POWERS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA (1962).
68. First, local governments have been given the power to render services to nonresi-
dents. F. SENGSTOcK, supra note 67, at 5-44; Sandalow, supra note 45, at 697-98, Without
this power municipal corporations could not "waste" their members' resources by ser-
vicing outsiders. F. SENesrocx, supra note 67, at 18-19. Second, they have been granted
power to acquire land for municipal purposes outside the corporate limits. F. SENerroclt,
supra note 67, at 5-11, 38-44. Acquisition may be by way of purchase or condemnation.
See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court of City of Tempe, 90 Ariz. 393, 868 P.2d
637 (1962). Acquisition of land, even by condemnation, affects residents of the other mt.
nicipality only insofar as the acquisition by any private landowner might affect them. The
ability to disregard another municipality's land-use regulations and to compel sales
obviously presents difficult problems of externalities. This is a problem of intergovern-
mental conflict, however, in which some general rule must be promulgated for dealing
with the competing governmental interests at stake.
69. Until the beginning of this century boundary adjustment was often by special act
of the legislature. This is still the case in a few jurisdictions. J. BourNs & H. ScIMANtyr,
Tim MErOPOLIs 402 (1965); R. DIXON & J. KERSTrETER, ADJUSrING MUNICII'AL IBOUNDA-
sREs: THE LAiW AND PRACTICE IN 48 STATES at v (preliminary draft, 1969).
70. See generally, J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, supra note 69, at 400-38; N. LrrLsttru,
supra note 45, at 22-32; F. SENsTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SouIroN "TO TiE MEROPOLITAN
AREA PROBLEM (1960); R. DIXON : . KERSTETTER, supra note 69; Mandelkcr, Municipal
Incorporation and Annexation: Recent Legislative Trends, 21 011o ST. L.J. 285 (1960).
71. Research by Dixon and Kerstetter in 1959 turned up 40 states with general laws
pertaining to annexation. Of 286 methods of annexation classified, they found only 24
of general applicability which did not provide for some such voice. R. Dixon & J. Xrtp.
sTETrER, supra note 69, at vi, viii.
That a remonstrance has been provided does not guarantee consideration of fringe
interests. See, e.g., IND. STATs. ANN. 48-722, 48-729 (Supp. 1969) (court shall approve an.
nexation if area meets specific criteria of urbanness and the municipality has a definite
plan to furnish services to the area within three years, where one-eighth of the abutting
area's borders coincide with the town line; where more than one-fourth so coincide, the
only criterion for approval is reasonable need within the near future).
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annex unincorporated contiguous territory,72 paying no heed to the
interests of those annexed.73
Unilateral annexation power has most often been granted only over
unincorporated contiguous land, either owned or completely sur-
rounded by the municipality. 74 Problems of representation here are
rather minimal. Residents of unincorporated surrounded land do not
constitute a group apart from the economic and social fabric of the
city. They benefit directly from its services and are citizens in all but
name, vote, and taxes.
In a few states, unilateral annexation power has been granted on a
broad scale.75 In these states, the legislature has clearly favored facilita-
tion of municipal expansion.76 Since these powers extend only over
unincorporated territory, it is difficult to construe such a policy as one
favoring the creation of metropolitan government,77 but such powers
72. Omaha, Neb., is the only jurisdiction found with the unilateral power to annex
certain incorporated territory. NEB. REv. STATS. § 14-117 (1954).
73. Unless no benefits whatsover would accrue to the annexed territory from the
annexation. Most statutes now make provision for furnishing of services. See notes 80.81
infra. It is of course irrelevant that those annexed are to be given a vote immediately
in the newly constituted polity. The question is whether they are given a voice in the
decision to annex their land in the first place.
74. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STATs. ch. 24 § 7-1-9 (1962) (owned, contiguous, unincorporated,
and vacant); MICH. Comtp. LAws ANN. § 117.9 (1967) (as in Ill.); MiNN. ST.ATs. A,,,.
§ 414.033, subd. 2 (1969) (owned, contiguous, unincorporated, surrounded); PA. StAxs.
ANN. § 53-35561 (1970) (owned, contiguous, unincorporated-cities less than 1.5,000
only); S.C. CoDE §§ 47-18.1, 47-22 (1962) (owned, contiguous, unincorparated); Wis. STATa.
ANN. § 66.025 (1965) (as in S.C.); Wyo. STATS. § 15.1-CO (1965) (as in S.C. but also non-
contiguous territory).
75. Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas seem to have the broadest unilateral
powers, with Indiana close behind. Nebraska and Indiana evidence a trend toward
granting more unilateral powers. In Indiana, before 1955, one or more persons could
appeal to a court to review a proposed annexation. This was then changed to a require-
ment of a majority of landowners or owners of 75% of the land. R. Dixon & J. KErLSTrEEn,
supra note 69, at 119. The court, upon review, was to determine inter alia uihether the
annexation was in the best interests of the area to be annexed. Towns (under 2000 pip.)
were given unilateral power to annex contiguous platted lots. Law of 1909, ch. 173, § 1.
[1909], IND. STATS. ANN. § 48-705 (repealed 1959). This power of small towns removed in
1959. The 1969 Legislature repealed all annexation laws and enacted new ones. .¢e Di-.
STATS. ANN. §§ 48-722, 48-729 (Supp. 1969). Towns and cities are again on the aie
footing, but the standards for judicial review have changed so as to omit tie interests
of those annexed. See note 71 supra.
Nebraska has perhaps the broadest statute of all. Before 1967, Omaha and Lincoln
were given broad unilateral annexation powers. Nan. REV. STATS. §§ 14-117, 15-101 (1954)
(no requirement of services or of urban character, only that city may not annex "agricul-
tural lands rural in character"). But cities of 5,000-40,000 were given unilateral pouer
over only subdivided or surrounded land, id. at § 16-106, and otherwise needed judicial
approval based on benefit to the area to be annexed. Smaller cities and villages alsays
needed suh approval. Id. at § 17-407. By NEB. Sss. Laws chs. 64, 74 (1967), howeser,
all these local units were given broad unilateral powers.
76. Broad annexation powers are best used with statutes prohibiting new incorpara-
tions within a given distance of existing corporate limits. See Mandelker, supra note 70;
J. BOLLENs & H. SCH.AuNDT, supra note 69, at 23-25 (briefly summarizing extensie 1961
and 1963 legislation).
77. Our largest metropolises, which are most in need of metropolitan government,
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may help to create cities large enough to constitute metropolitan en-
tities in and of themselves.
Such statutes create room for abuse. The municipality may wish
to annex one gerrymandered strip of property that produces revenue,
leaving a similar but poorer area untouched.78 The municipality may
try to annex land which is not yet urban in character, and thus can-
not gain by its association with the city, again to increase its revenue
base. Once the territory is annexed, no matter how urban in character
it may be, the city might not plan to provide it with the same level of
services as are furnished elsewhere in the city.
Many states have recognized the possibility that legitimate annexee
interests might be ignored, by providing for some judicial or admin-
istrative review of municipal initiative. 0 Even the states authorizing
unilateral annexation powers require that the municipality furnish
adequate services as soon as possible, 0 and often require that other
indicators of urban character be evident at the time of annexation.,'
In general, therefore, annexee interests are protected by statute. On
this ground unilateral annexation powers are distinguishable from
zoning ordinances.
2. Extraterritorial Police Powers and Land Use Controls
Extraterritorial police powers were first delegated to localities to
deal with problems which extended over political boundaries. Power
was granted to control health hazards,82 the operation of quasi-nui-
have little surrounding unincorporated territory left. Suburbs are generally separate,
autonomous governments. Thus the largest annexations of the post-World War II era
have come in places like Oklahoma City and Dallas. See J. BOLLENS & H. SCIMANDTr,
supra note 69, at 414-18.
78. Fringe resistance "does not always result from the fringe playing the role of the
devil and the city the innocent but powerless angel." J. BoLLENs & H. SCIMANor, supra
note 69, at 421, discussing these "leap-frog annexations."
79. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041 (1964). The Virginia system of an impartial, specially
convened court to hear the merits of a proposed annexation, balancing the interests of
town and county, has often been praised. See Bain, Recent Developments in the 'irginia
Annexation System, 46 VA. L. Rza'. 1023 (1960). For an outdated but representative list,
see R. DIXON & J. KERSTMTER, supra note 69. Alaska, California, Minnesota, Washington,
and Wisconsin now have permanent administrative agencies in each county designed to
review the fairness of proposed annexations, a system differing in some respects from
the Virginia system. For brief comment see J. BOlLENS & H. SCHnIANDT, supra note 69,
at 425-27. See also N.C. STATS. §§ 160-445, 160-446 (1964) (annexation by unilateral
municipal initiative unless 15% of the voters in annexed areas petition for a referendum).
80. The Nebraska legislature, in its expansive 1967 legislation, required that service
be rendered "as soon as practicable." NEB. SEss. LAWS cli. 64 (1967). Missouri reqtireg
services "within a reasonable time." ANN. MO. STAT. § 71-015 (Supp. 1969), IND. STA'Is.
ANN. §§ 48-722, 48-729 (Supp. 1969) (services within 3 years).
81. See, e.g., IND. STATS. ANN. §§ 48-722, 48-729 (Supp. 1969).
82. City of Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474 (1877) (pollution of city water supply);
Harrison v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 1 Gill (Md.) 24 (1843) (quarantine).
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sances like slaughterhousessa and hog farms8 4 and the regulation of
quasi-immoral activities such as the sale of liquor.8 These grants were
validated either on the basis of the state's general power to delegate8 o
or on the narrower ground of necessity to protect town health, safety,
morals, or welfare.8 7
Just as the law of zoning grew out of the law of nuisance,88 the sanc-
tioned extraterritorial control of nuisances gradually led to validation
of extraterritorial land-use controls.89 Extraterritorial subdivision con-
trols have been granted to some class of municipalities in more than
half the states. 0 Subdivision regulations0 ' can increase the cost of
housing,92 and may require the use of more land than othenvise might
Without such a grant of power, municipalities had been held unable to enact such reg-
ulations. City of Duluth v. Orr, 115 Minn. 267, 132 N.W. 265 (1911) (right to regulate
storage of explosives beyond borders). E. McQiw.N, supra note 67, at §§ 10.07, 24.57.
83. Chicago Packing and Provision Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill. 221 (1878).
84. State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912).
85. Lutz v. City of Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466, 10 N.E. 411 (1886); Town of Gower
v. Agee, 128 Mo. App. 427, 107 S.W. 999 (1908).
86. Chicago Packing and Provision Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 IlL 221 (1878); Lutz v.
City of Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466, 10 N.E. 411 (1886).
87. State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912); Town of Gov,'er v. Agee, 128 Mo.
App. 427, 107 S.W. 999 (1908). Even the Malone court, supra note 67, admitted that cer-
tain police powers could be delegated on an extraterritorial basis.
88. See S. TOLL, ZONED AmramcA_, (1959).
89. Illinois is perhaps the best example of the case law development in this area.
In 1878 the court upheld the extraterritorial regulation of slaughterhouses (in another
municipalityl), citing only the "creature" theory of state-municipal relations. Chicago
Packing and Provision Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 Il. 2291 (1878). Seventy.seven years
later, with nothing apparent in between, the court validated extraterritorial control of
water pollution affecting the city's water supply, citing Chicago Paching. City of West
Frankfort v. Fullop, 6 Ill. 2d 609, 129 N.E.2d 682 (1955). A year later, again with nojustification besides precedent, the court declared that the legislature could confer any
extraterritorial police power (here subdivision control) on a municipality. Pctterson v.
City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
90. Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Devtelop-
ment, 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1, 26 n.59 (list of statutes).
91. Subdivision regulations
arose from the need of the local government to assure a rational pattern of streets
as new areas were developed. Controls applied through specification or approval
of street and width; water supply, sewerage, drainage, and roadway design and
construction; grading plans; and lot size and configuration.
ASPO, supra note 2, at 4.
92. Subdivision regulations "allocate costs of public facilities between the subdivider
[and thus the ultimate consumer] and local taxpayers." Brua.Dima Tim AmrmicA Crry,
supra note 33, at 203.
Developers are usually required to install or pay for the installation of newer systems,
water, and street light improvements, all of which specificall), sene the new tract.
More recently, communities have required dedication of land-or payments in lieu thereof
-for parks and schools. This device could be a means of getting newcomers to pay their
fair share for collective goods that everyone else in the community also pa)s for- it could
also be-and often is---a device for taxing newcomers more than older residents. It has
been argued that any fees, payments, or dedications not justified by costs are unconsti-
tutional. Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community
Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactons, 73 YALE LJ. 1119
(1964). See also Pioneer Trust & Say. Bk. v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 2 II. 2d 375, 176
N.E.2d 799 (1961) (dedication of land for school); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove,
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be needed. But the exclusionary and extraterritorial effects of sub-
division regulations are likely to be much smaller than those of zoning,
for resources other than land are usually involved. Nor do subdivision
regulations affect which uses of land are permitted or prohibited. 03
And for the developer or homebuyer, subdivision controls are not
generally as costly as zoning requirements.94
The validity of extraterritorial subdivision regulations has been
litigated only twice. Both cases upheld the power. In Petterson V,
City of Naperville,95 the Illinois court upheld a grant of subdivision
control up to one and one-half miles beyond the corporate limits.
Relying on a case which sustained extraterritorial regulation of meat-
packing plants, the court ruled that the state may confer special extra-
territorial powers whenever a valid exercise of the police power is in-
volved. The court did not discuss specifically the reasonableness of
subdivision controls, and the issue of representation was apparently
not raised by either party.
A much earlier case, Prudential Cooperative Realty Co. v. City of
Youngstown,96 also relied on the precedent of extraterritorial police
powers to regulate health hazards,97 but declared that the power dele-
gated must be reasonable in light of the circumstances. In assessing
reasonableness, the court found that the city had a substantial interest
in establishing minimum development standards for lands to be an-
19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960) (payment in lieu of dedication); Kelber v. City of
Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957) (fees for approval of subdivision map).
Developers nevertheless usually comply with these demands. Given community powers
of administrative delay and disapproval on collateral matters, compliance is usually cheaper
in the long run. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 53 (1966).
Perhaps just as important as actual exactions are the variable and unpredictable costs
imposed by administrative delays. These costs cannot be adequately internalized, partic-
ularly where homes are pre-sold. Unexpected delays or increased exactions can then result
in a loss instead of a profit. One developer in Branford, Connecticut, for example, pre-
sold his houses. After construction had started and the homes had been sold, the town
amended its subdivision regulations to require asphalt instead of oil and gravel roads.
He went bankrupt. The use of special permits, design review boards and the like almost
ensure this sort of constant bureaucratic attention to and interference in leveloplment
-interference that might often be justified for health and safety purposes, but just
as often goes beyond the bounds of police power requirements. For a discussion of when
such regulations may be unnecessary, see Yearwood, Accepted Controls of Land Sub.
division, 45 J. URBAN LAW 217, 246-50 (1967).
93. City of Carlsbad v. Caviness, 66 N.M. 230, 346 I.2d 310 (1959) (extraterritorial
subdivision authority could not be used to prohibit establishment of liquor store),
94. It should be noted that zoning requirements may affect subdivision costs as well,
since many utilities are priced by the front foot. Assuming a constant, given set of sub-
division regulations, it was estimated in 1958 that total improvement costs on a 6,000
sq. ft. lot came to $1700. A 20,000 sq. ft. lot costs $2000 to improve, a 40,000 sq. ft. lot,
$2250, and an 80,000 sq. ft. lot, $2550. URBAN LAND INsrITU'rE, supra note 33, at 23.
Besides utilities, grading and landscaping costs may rise with lot size.
95. 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
96. 118 Ohio St. 204, 160 N.E. 695 (1928).
97. 118 Ohio St. at 210, 160 N.E. at 697.
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nexed in the foreseeable future,9 8 since the city is responsible for
maintaining streets and providing other municipal services. The issue
of representation was again not mentioned.
Express extraterritorial zoning powers, because they impinge more
heavily on rights connected with ownership of property, have been
granted less frequently than extraterritorial subdivision controls."
Most states which have granted extraterritorial zoning powers have
circumscribed the delegation. In Illinois and Tennessee the power is
valid only if the county has not adopted its own zoning regulations.'0
In Kentucky the municipality must first make substantial efforts to
secure county cooperation in setting up a jointly administered plan-
ning and zoning program, and even then must have county permission
to zone beyond its borders.' 0 ' In both North Carolina and Wisconsin,
the body which legislates and administers extraterritorial zoning or-
dinances must be composed half of city residents, half of residents of
the non-municipal area.102 In these instances, the state has provided
98. 118 Ohio St. at 212-13, 106 N.E. at 697-98. The authority here extended three
miles beyond corporate limits.
99. See generally F. SENxs'rocK, supra note 67, at 61-69; Becker, supra note 90, at S0.54;
Melli 8, Devoy, Extraterritorial Planning and Urban Growth, 1959 WIs. L. Rv. 55;
Bartelt, Extraterritorial Zoning: Reflections on Validity, 32 NomRE D.MStE LAw. 867
(1957); Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10 MINN. L. REV. 475 and 564
(1926).
100. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (1961); TNN. CODE ANN. § 13-711 (Cumulative
Supp. 1969) (superseded by subsequent county zoning, § 13-715). The validity of these
statutes has never been at issue in a case.
101. Ky. Rmv. STATs. § 100.117 (1966). The city that has complied with these provisions
but has failed to get county support may exercise subdivision control powers up to
five miles beyond its borders. § 100.131. The city may also exercise "other" powers.
including (presumably) zoning, if the county legislative body so allows. rd. The interests
of nonresidents of the city are thus protected to some extent by their elected county
representatives.
This statutory scheme represents quite a change from prior legislation. Previously
municipalities had the power to zone within their "municipal areas," which were defined
as "the surrounding territory which bears relation to the planning and zoning of the city."
KY. REy. STATS. § 100.010(6); Smeltzer v. Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 694, 225 S.W2d 96, 97
(1949); American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Ct. App. Ky. 1955). These
two cases challenged zoning decisions pursuant to the act, but in both cases the parties
won without reaching the validity of the statute.
These two decisions, while not invalidating extraterritorial zoning in Kentucky, gave
notice that the state courts would construe the power strictly. The only justification
for the power, it was ciear, was facilitation of orderly urban development. On the other
hand, as dicta in Smeltzer made clear:
Mhe city's action, if sustained, seriously impairs the rights of a person owning
property beyond its limits who has no voice in its legislative policies, and who
receives no legally recognizable tienefit to such property from the city government.
Id. at 696, 225 S.W2d at 97. Legislation has now partially solved this representational
problem by giving the county a larger role to play.
102. N.C. GEN. STATs. § 160-181.2 (1964), as amended, (Cumulative Supp. 190); Wis.
STATS. ANN. § 62,23(7a) (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1969). The North Carolina statute
gives one-mile extraterritorial zoning powers to any town with over 1250 population.
But:
[A]s a prerequisite to the exercise of such powers, the membership of the zoning
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for both county and municipal involvement in deciding land uses at
the urban fringe. The governed fringe residents thus have a voice, but
the municipality may protect itself from the extraterritorial impact of
decisions concerning the zoning of suburban land. The interest of the
municipality in assuring coherent development is even greater when
the costs of this development may be further internalized through an-
nexation. Three of the four cases touching at all on the extraterritorial
zoning power rely on some version of this argument.10 3
In a few states, legislatures have granted broad extraterritorial
zoning powers to municipalities.10 In only one case has the constitu-
tionality of such a statute been litigated. 05 In upholding the statute
commission or planning board charged with the preparation of proposed regulations
for the one mile area outside of the corporate limits shall be increased to Include
additional members who shall represent such outside area.
The Wisconsin statute grants powers over a 3 or 1 mile radius depending on the size
of the municipality. The city, on its own initiative (as in N.C.?, resolves to exercise
the power. After giving the affected area notice (thus enabling its legislative body to
adopt whatever interim ordinances it wants), the cty may declare a freeze on zoning
for up to two years while permanent standards are worked out. A joint board Is then
appointed, half from the city a hahalf om m the town affected, to decide upon the new
ordinances. Thus in Wisconsin, the only substantial unilateral power given to the city
is the power to declare a "freeze" of the existing zoning map. This power was challenge(d
in Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 1 33 N.W2d 257 (1965).
In response to the representational claim the court cited legislative history applauding
the bill because "'the towns affected will have a substantial voice in the preparation
of the ordinance"' and can choose the zoning which will be frozen. Id. at 36, 133 N.W.2d
at 261. The broad justification for the statute, once the representational claim had been
dispensed with, was again orderly growth.
Cf. Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co., 70 Cal. 2d 627, 75 Cal. Rptr. 766, 451 P.2d 406 (1969),
where a majority of the California Supreme Court upheld a statutory scheme which de-
nied residents of a special district the vote for a given period of time. The California
court, over strenuous objection from three out of the seven justices, held that the diseu-
franchisement was only temporary, power being transferred to residents from landown-
ers within a specific period of time. Perhaps this is an underlying rationale of the Wal
worth decision.
103. See notes 101-102 supra. The fourth case, and first chronologically, was City of
Raleigh v. Morand, 247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E2d 870 (1957), app. dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 357 U.S. 343 (1958). The Morand court assumed broad state
discretion without discussing any particular state interest.
104. ALA. CODE § 37-797 (1958), as amended (Supp. 1967) (power 5 miles beyond
corporate limits over unincorporated territory; county may zone in such area only If
municipality does not); NEB. Rv. STATS. §§ 14-117, 15-104, 16-901, 17-413, 17-1001 (1051)
(power one mile beyond limits for villages and cities of 1000-5000 pop., two miles for
larger cities); O"LA. REV. STATS. § 19-863.2, -.13, -.19 (1962), as amended (Supp, 1969)
(power five miles beyond limits; limited to cities over 180,000). If extraterritorlal zoning
by municipalities pursuant to Illinois law is not repealed by subsequent county zoning,
powers granted in that state could be substantial. See note 100 supra.
105. Schlientz v. City of North Platte, 172 Neb. 477, 110 N.W.2d 58 (1961). The power
seems assumed to be valid in Alabama. See Fleetwood Development Corp. v. City of
Vestavia Hills, 282 Ala. 439, 212 So. 2d 693 (1968) (planning & zoning commission had
approved requested rezoning of plaintiff's land-outsilde corporate limits-but city council,
in which plaintiff was not represented, disapproved the rezoning; city action held valid).
An Oklahoma case, Elias v. City of Tulsa, 408 P.2d 517 (Okla. 1965) invalidated a super-
seded version of the state statute which had granted the power to cities of 180,000.
240,000, there being no reasonable justification for granting the power to Tulsa but not
to Oklahoma City. The Elias court explicitly refused to consider the general validity
of the extraterritorial power.
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the court was clearly influenced by the fact that extraterritorial zoning
was not a new phenomenon in Nebraska1 00 and by the argument that
the power was necessary for healthy municipal growth. In answering
plaintiff's claim that his lack of representation denied him due process
of law, the court held that the means of selecting municipal govern-
ment officials was completely within the state's discretion. In balancing
the interests of local government and democratic participation, the
court thus found the latter to be of negligible weight.107
The validity of the argument for complete state discretion 0 s is, in
the light of Avery v. Midland Countyo9 and Kramer v. Union Free
School District,'" dubious. The state may no longer claim total free-
dom in the structuring of local government."' The individual's in-
terest in participation is now regarded as substantial, and the state
may achieve its goal of orderly urban development by other means.
Even if the state's interest in orderly development were accorded more
weight, extraterritorial zoning statutes are, in any event, distingush-
able from the great majority of zoning ordinances. With one ex-
ception, extraterritorial zoning statutes extend only over unincorpo-
rated areas. Almost all vacant land in metropolitan areas lies within
incorporated suburbs, and the rationale of orderly urban development
is obviously inapposite.
IV.
Most zoning enabling acts delegate to local governments the power
to regulate the use and development only of land within their bound-
106. Omaha and Lincoln had had extraterritorial zoning powers since 1925 and 1929,
respectively. 172 Neb. at 492, 110 NAV.2d at 68. The validity of these statutes has
apparently never been litigated.
107. Id.
108. Municipal corporations are creatures of the legislature:
...There is no doubt but that the Legislature may provide for their officers and
officials and the manner of their selection and appointment.. . . [Plersons [living
in the area adjacent to and I mile beyond the corporate limits of the city)] have
neither a constitutional nor inherent right to local self-government. The Lgisla-
ture may subject them to the jurisdiction of officers for whom they have no voice
in the selection. This does not constitute a violation of any constitutional provision.
172 Neb. at 489-90, 100 NAV.2d at 66-67.
109. 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (one man, one vote standard held to apply at local level).
110. 395 U.S. 624 (1969). See p. 899 supra.
111. The majority of a State-by constitutional provision, by referendum, or
through accurately apportioned representatives-can no more place a minority
in oversize districts . . . than they can deprive the minority of the ballot al-
together.. .. Government-National, State, and local-must grant to each citizen
the equal protection of its laws, which includes an equal opportunity to influence
the election of lawmakers, no matter how large the majority wishing to deprive
other citizens of equal treatment or how small the minority who object to their
mistreatment.
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aries.11 2 This delegation of control, unlike extraterritorial zoning
powers, is intimately related to the legitimate delegation of power
over purely local matters, such as taxes, schools, and industrial de.
velopment. Because most vacant land lies in suburbs, however, the
state's delegation of zoning powers to all local units is in reality a grant
of power to suburbanites." 3
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481-82, n.6 (1968). Is there more latitude for state
action when statutes not statewide in application are at issue? Cf. Moody v. Flowerg,
387 U.S. 97 (1967).
112. Zoning enabling acts confine municipal initiative very little. Occasionally, how.
ever, courts may devise vague, implicit rules for dealing with excess zeal. Thus large lot
zoning has on occasion been invalidated where the minimum required was considerably
greater than that of average current development. Spanier v. Town of Huntington, 19
Misc. 2d 979, 188 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 31
Cal. Rptr. 355, 282 P.2d 375 (1963); LaSalle National Bank v. City of Highland Park,
27 Ill. 2d 350, 189 N.E.2d 302 (1963).
113. Courts have taken tentative steps toward recognizing outsider interests, Where
zoning of land at the boundary of a municipality is inconsistent with surrounding land
use in an adjacent municipality, the courts have often decreed that the zoning municipality
must consider the land uses in this adjacent area. Huttig v. City of Richmond Height,
372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963) (parcel zoned for residential use; surrounding land in adjacent
municipality, developed for commercial use; zoning held invalid); Chusud Realty Corp.
v. Village of Kensington, 22 App. Div. 2d 895, 255 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 1961)
Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 1 111. 2d 28, 115 N.E.2d 315 (1953). For a discussion
of other similar cases of this type, see Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders,
1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 108-15; Note, Regional Development and the Courts, 16 SvaA.
CUsE L. REv. 600 (1965). These cases, whatever their rhetorical accoutrements, do not
really make a case for considering regional needs. They consider only the direct effect
on one parcel of land of development of other adjacent parcels.
Similarly, the few cases which allow nonresidents standing to challenge a municipality's
zoning are based on the effect such zoning would have on adjacent nonmunicipal
parcels. Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 84 P.2d 96 (Col. 1963); Hamelin v. Zoning Bid.,
19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (1955) (interesting in that of six nonresidents given
standing, only one was adjacent landowner); Borough of Leonia v. Borough of Fort Lee,
56 N.J. Super. 185, 151 A2d 540 (1959); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dunont,
15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954) (should not make "a fetish out of invisible mtclpalboundary lines," id. at 247, 10  A.2d at 446); Koppel v. City of Fainvay, 189 an. 710,
371 P.2d 113 (1962).
The courts have rarely considered nonmunidpal land uses not contiguous to the zon-
ing municipality. When they have done so, it has generally been to justify the nu.
nicipality's exclusion of some type of land use from its borders. Valley View Village,
Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955) (exclusion of all nonresidential uses
justified on basis of municipal determination that surrounding region supplied sufliclent
nonresidential land for regional needs); Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of
Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949) (exclusion of industry); Fanale v. Borough of
Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958) (exclusion of apartments); see also
Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 115-17; Note,
Regional Development and the Courts, 16 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 600, 611 (1965); see also
Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963).
The only cases thus far to invalidate an exclusionary ordinance on the grounds,
inter alia, that it conflicts with regional needs, are from Pennsylvania. In National Laud
& Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), the court invalidated a four acre
minimum lot size restriction, stressing "the town's responsibility to those who do not
yet live in the township but who are part, or may become part, of the population
expansion of the suburbs." Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612. The court concluded that the
township could not "stand in the way of the natural forces which send our growing
population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live,/'
Id. Cf. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A,2d 851 (1958);
Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952). See also Note,
Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1251 (1966).
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Because vacant land is an essential, nontransferable resource present
in only some communities, this delegation cannot be justified on the
same grounds as are other grants of local power. Action by commu-
nities which control large amounts of vacant land seriously affects
unrepresented nonresidents. Suburban exclusionary practices further
undermine the state's interest in delegation, since individual mobility
is thereby greatly curtailed and change in land use patterns is stifled.
Any change in policy which might be expected to flow from the sub-
urb's internal political process is hampered by the exclusion from the
community, through lot size zoning regulations, of citizens who would
be likely to work for change. In such situations, where the political
structure is immune from internal challenge, courts have even more
reason to force a restructuring of the political system.'14 Since the state
cannot here assert a compelling interest in delegation, and since indi-
vidual voting rights are seriously compromised, acts delegating control
over vacant land to local political units should be held unconstitu-
tional.
Were this truly a case involving denial or dilution of the franchise,
the court could extend the franchise to interested parties. However,
the appropriate remedies here are either to provide outsiders access to
suburban communities or to enlarge the constituency by drawing new
jurisdictional lines. Neither of these remedies could appropriately be
ordered by a court. In declaring the present system unconstitutional,
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed its National Land decision in two recent
cases. In In re Appeal of Girsh, No. 164 (Pa. Sup. CL, Feb. 13, 1970), te court in-
validated a local ordinance excluding all apartment houses from the town. In In re
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., No. 218 (Pa. Sup. CL, Feb. 24, 1970). thc court
invalidated a two acre lot-minimum as unreasonable, declaring that "an exdusionary
purpose or result is not acceptable in Pennsylvania" (at 2). In both cases the court
emphasized the property owner's right to use his property as he sees fit, absent sufficient
reason for government intervention. To the towns' contention in both cases that popula-
tion growth would impose increasing costs for municipal services, the court responded
that a town may not act to limit population growth and must assume the responsibility
for providing new residents with adequate services. Preservation of aesthetic character
and fiscal prudence were both rejected as justifications for exclusionary ordinances. The
applicability of these decisions to other jurisdictions, given the unusual weight accorded
by Pennsylvania courts to property owner interests, is problematic.
114. The Court is faced with
legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation. . . .
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Cf. Baker v. Carr,
369 US. 186 (1962). See also Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd
sub. nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
[T]he poor and . . . racial minorities . . . are not always assured of a full and
fair hearing through the ordinary political processes, not so much because of the
chance of outright bias, but because of the abiding danger tait tie power structure
. . . may incline to pay little heed to even the deserving interests of a politically
voiceless and invisible minority.
269 F. Supp. at 507-08.
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therefore, the court should explain the principles upon which it bases
its decision, and enjoin enforcement of existing ordinances after a
certain date, thus leaving final resolution of the problem to the legis-
lature.
A number of alternatives might emerge:
1. A system whereby a nonresident could affirm his interest in mu-
nicipal land-use decisions, thereby acquiring the right to vote in zon-
ing board elections. If the board is, as is often the case, the local
general purpose legislative body, such a solution would eliminate the
viability of local government. While constitutionally acceptable, it
would be administratively unfeasible and inadvisable.
2. Local decision making with metropolitan or regional review.
The reviewing agency would be chosen in part by those now un-
represented in the system. Such an agency would judge municipal
action in light of regional needs. This solution is politically feasible.
It is unlikely to result in substantial change, however, because op.
portunities for administrative delay are great and because subur-
banites are still protected from direct political competition by an
administrative buffer.
3. A more drastic alternative would be to remove local zoning
powers entirely, vesting all powers of regulation in branches of a state-
directed, state-appointed or regionally elected agency. By removing
the power of delay from suburban administrators, this solution might
result in substantial change, but at the cost of eliminating all local
decision making.
4. Finally, the state statute might simultaneously retain local con-
trol but also set forth state-wide standards11, In Massachusetts, for ex-
ample, towns are required to dedicate a quota of land and housing
units to moderate and low cost housing.11 6 This solution is the sim-
plest, leaving substantial power at the local level. Like the metropoli-
tan review solution, however, implementation is administrative rather
than political.
What would actually emerge from the legislature is, of course, un-
certain. While there is a presumption that land use decisions would
be different if "democratically" arrived at, there is no guarantee. State
legislatures are increasingly influenced by suburban constituencies
and may therefore tend to reinstitute the status quo. A voice in the
decision making process will serve to raise issues and to permit per-
115. Cf. Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418, 1437-41 (1969).
116. MAss. GEN. LAws 40B § 2023 (1932), as amended (1969).
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suasion; it will not necessarily alter outcomes so long as economic
separatism is a politically legitimate goal. 17
117. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it "decided in National Land that
a scheme of zoning that has an exclusionary purpose or result is not acceptable in
Pennsylvania." In re Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., No. 218, at 2 (Sup. CL Pa.,
Feb. 24, 1970). See National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 50-, 215 A2d
597 (1965). The reasoning of these cases, however, is that governmental regulation
"may not prevent permanently the reasonable use of private property .... ." In re
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., at 5. The Pennsylvania Court's reputation for con-
servative jurisprudence and concern with property rights had led most persons active
in this area to doubt the applicability of these decisions in other jurisdictions.
Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit declared:
Surely, if the environmental benefits of land use planning are to be enjoyed
by a city and the quality of life of its residents is accordingly to be improved,
the poor cannot be exduded from enjoyment of the benefits. Gien the recognized
importance of equal opportunities in housing, it may well be, as matter of law,
that it is the responsibility of a city and its planning oflidals to se that thc City's
plan as initiated or as it develops accommodates the needs of its low-income families,
who usually-if not always--are members of minority groups.
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, No. 25,195
at 8-9 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1970).
925
